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provision (Ohio Gen. Code Sec. I1247), which is common in most
states, providing that the action of an insane person must be brought by
his guardian. That this section is mandatory has been expressly held in
Reno v. Love, 25 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 129, 26 Ohio C.D. 296, 6o Bull.
497, affirmed without opinion in 88 Ohio St. 623 (1916). The pro-
vision is only applicable, however, where the party has been adjudged
insane by proceedings instituted for that purpose, and where there has
been a guardian appointed at the time the suit is brought. 22 Ohio Jur.,
"Insane Persons," sec. 40. By section 11249 of the General Code, it is
provided that, where the plaintiff becomes insane or his insanity is dis-
covered after the action is brought, it shall be prosecuted by his guardian
or trustee appointed by the court. Section I 125I provides that where
the insanity is not manifest to the court, the question may be tried by
the court or a jury impaneled for that purpose.
As a result of the foregoing statutory provisions, the fact that the
accused is the party plaintiff, and the fact that the action is a civil pro-
ceeding, would not appear to be sufficient reasons for saying that the
insanity of the accused in an extradition proceeding is immaterial. If
these provisions are to be construed liberally, it would seem that, upon
the suggestion of insanity, it would be incumbent upon the court to
investigate the charge, and, if found to be true, appoint a trustee whose




CONTRACTS AND QUASI-CONTRACTS OF PARENT AND CHILD
The plaintiff filed an action against the defendant, executor of his
mother's will, to recover for personal services rendered by him during
the six years immediately preceding her death. The decedent had lived
at the Hotel Alms and the plaintiff lived with his family about one mile
therefrom. The services consisted in personal attention to the mother
and in assisting her in the management of her property consisting of
about eighty thousand dollars worth of securities. The court of appeals
held (I) that the plaintiff could not recover on a quasi-contractual
theory for work and labor performed because of the close family rela-
tionship of the parties; (2) that the evidence was not of a sufficiently
high degree to warrant recovery on a contractual basis. Woods v. Fifth-
Third Union Trust Co., 54 Ohio App. 303, 6 N.E. (2d) 987 (936).
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Ordinarily, evidence that the defendant has acquiesced in the plain-
tiff's conferring a substantial benefit upon him will lead to the inference
that the plaintiff expected payment and thought the defendant knew
that he expected it, thus giving rise to a contract implied in law. Such
inference or presumption, as some courts call it) disappears, however,
when the recipient of the services is a member of the server's family.
Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, secs. 50, 51 (1913); Lovet v. Price,
Wright (Ohio) 89 (1832); Willis v. Dun, Admr., Wright (Ohio)
133 (1832). It would seem that with this broad principle in mind, the
courts should have little difficulty in cases involving a parent and child
where the family relationship is seen at its strongest. Even in this situa-
tion, however, although all recognize the general rule, there are certain
classes of cases which have bothered the courts.
In the simplest situation, that of the minor child living at home,
there seems to be complete unanimity in refusing to recognize the possi-
bility of a contract implied in law under any circumstances. Farley v.
Stacy, 177 Ky. 109, 197 S.W. 636, I A.L.R. 1181 (917). Again
in the case of the adult child living at home, the courts, as a whole, seem
to have no trouble in ruling out any presumption of expectation of pay-
ment for services rendered. Lovet v. Price, supra; Willis v. Dun, supra;
A4mbler v. Chapman, 22 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 458, 33 Ohio C.D. 664
(1915); Wainwright Trust Co. v. Kinder, 69 Ind. App. 88, 120
N.E. 419 (1918); Parmenter v. Parmenter, 157 Iowa 195, 138
N.W. 438 (1912). However, if there has been a severance of the
household relationship and then a return at the request of the defendant,
some courts are inclined to view this situation as an ordinary person to
person relationship despite the fact that the parties are parent and child.
In re Chafee's Est., 204 N.Y. Supp. 765, 122 Misc. 768 (1924);
Carrell v. McDonnell, 139 Mo. App. 450, 122 S.W. 1129 (1909);
Contra, Butler v. Kent, 152 Ala. 594, 44 So. 863 (1907). Ohio,
however, refuses to recognize this distinction and still maintains that the
blood tie of the parties raises at least an inference of gratuity even though
there has been a parting from the family and then a return. Schaible,
Admx. v. Schoot, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 750 (1925)-
The most difficult problem arises, however, in the situation where
there has been an actual physical severance of the household relationship.
The majority view would seem to be that the inference of gratuity which
arises when services are rendered a parent by the child, or vice versa,
is based upon the fact that the parties are living together under one roof
rather than upon the consanguinity of the parent and child, and thus
the inference disappears with the severance of the household relationship.
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Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, sec. 5 1; Keener, Quasi-Contracts, p. 317
(1923); Page v. Page, 73 N.H. 305, 61 At. 356 (1905); Disbrow
v. Durand, 54 N.J.L. 343, 24 Ad. 545 (1892); Parker's Heirs v.
Parker's Ydmr., 33 Ala. 459 (1859).
Ohio, however, has never drawn the above distinction, and in this
state the conclusion of non-liability is based on the ground of the moral
obligation which a parent and child owe to each other rather than on
any theory of the cooperation engendered by parties living together in
the same household. For similar language, see Bolsinger v. Halliday,
22 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 289 (1915); Woods v. Fifth-Third Union
Trust Co., sutra.
Viewing it in this light the court sees no reason to feel that there is
any lessening of this moral obligation merely because the parent and
child no longer live together in the same house. Most Ohio cases, there-
fore, settle the matter as did the principal case simply by ignoring the
majority view and are seemingly unaware that they are in the minority
by holding this way. The court itself summarizes this philosophy in the
principal case when it says: "The common experience of mankind is
that a son in rendering such service does it because of the moral duty
which he owes to his mother." Woods v. Fifth-Third Union Trust Co.,
supra, at p. 988.
It is submitted, that if one finds the basis for this presumption of
gratuity in the moral obligations which are mutually owed by the parent
and child, then the Ohio court is probably correct in refusing to recog-
nize that there is any lessening of these bonds by the mere fact that the
parties no longer reside under the same roof.
Since a quasi-contractual theory is usually unavailable in a parent-
child situation, what are the possibilities for recovery in contract? The
answer to this question would seem largely to depend on the force
which the various courts give to the inference of gratuity arising from
the family relationship. To some courts it is merely strong enough to put
the burden of proof on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the
evidence circumstances which will at least give rise to a contract implied
in fact. Hartley v. Bohrer, 52 Idaho 72, ii Pac. (2d) 66 (1932);
Butler v. Kent, 152 Ala. 594, 44 SO. 863 (1907). In other jurisdic-
tions a contract implied in fact will be sufficient to overcome the force
of the inference of gratuity. But such an implied contract must be
established by more than a mere preponderance of the evidence; it must
be established by the highest degree of civil proof, whether that be called
"clear and convincing," or "clear and indubitable," or "direct, positive
and unequivocal." Baugh v. Baugh's 4dmr., 33 Ky. 148, 109 S.W.
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345 (I9O8); Gardner v. Gardner, 112 W.Va. 583, I66 S.E. 112
(932). Finally, there are some states which say that this presumption
of gratuity may only be overcome by proof of an express contract. Ellis
v. Cox, 176 N.C. 616, 97 S.E. 468 (1918); Hialey v. Hialey's Est.,
157 Mich. 45, 121 N.W. 465 (1902); McNemar v. McNemar, 137
Ill. App. 504 (1907).
To which of these views does Ohio subscribe? To answer such a
question is no easy problem. The language in the Ohio cases makes it
difficult to tell exactly whether a contract implied in fact is possible in
such a situation, or whether an express contract is required. Since the
cases of Hinkle v. Sage, 67 Ohio St. 256, 65 N.E. 999 (1903) and
Merrick v. Ditzler, 91 Ohio St. 256, 11o N.E. 493 (1915), there is
no doubt that whatever kind of contract is required, whether it be
implied in fact or express, it must be established by "clear and unequiv-
ocal" or "clear and convincing" proof. But is it possible by such evidence
to establish circumstances and facts from which a contract will be im-
plied, or is it necessary to have an express contract upon which to predi-
cate recovery? There is language in many cases which would seem to
indicate that the former is the Ohio law. In re Skelton, 20 Ohio C.C.
704, 1I Ohio C.D. 372 (19oo); In re Ward, 21 Ohio C.C. 753, 12
Ohio C.D. 44 (19O1); Hawthorne v. McClure, 4 Ohio C.C. II, 2
Ohio C.D. 390 (1889). Other cases, however, including the leading case
on the point, lay down as the requirement an express contract established
by clear and unequivocal language. Hinkle v. Sage, supra; Merrick v.
Ditzler, supra; Schaible, 4dmx. v. Schoot, supra. Perhaps the explana-
tion, if explanation there is, of this seemingly irreconcilable difference is
contained in a quotation from the leading Ohio case of Hinkle v. Sage,
supra, at page 263 where the court says: "Although an actual contract,
one capable of enforcement as such, must be clearly and unequivocably
proved, it may be proved by either direct or indirect evidence. Express
contracts which are proved by the declarations and conduct of the parties
and other circumstances, all of which are explainable only upon the
theory of a mutual agreement, are often called, although not with entire
accuracy, implied contracts, and this distinction will explain the ambigu-
ity of some authorities and the apparent contrariety of others." In view
of this statement, a possible explanation of the conflict in the Ohio deci-
sions is that what some courts would regard as a contract implied in fact,
proved by "clear and convincing" evidence, the Ohio court would regard
as an express contract.
.In conclusion then, the Ohio law as to the possibilities for recovery
for services rendered between parent and child may be summarized as:
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(I) No possibility for recovery on a quasi-contractual theory. (2) If
the circumstances show by clear and convincing evidence that the parties
intended compensation for the services, then possibly there may be a
recovery on a contract implied in fact. (3) But according to the
language in some cases (unless it can be explained on the basis of a mis-
understanding of the true meaning of "express contract") recovery is
only possible upon proof of an express contract between the parties.
JAMES A. GORRELL
EQUITY
ExcusE FOR NON-PERFORMANCE OF CONDITIONS IN SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE
Plaintiff owned land on which the defendant held a first mortgage
of $IO,348.oo and on which there was a second mortgage of
$27752.00. At the suggestion of the defendant, the plaintiff arranged
to get a loan of $9500.00 from the Federal Land Bank. The defendant
and the other creditors were to accept a scale down so that this could
be used to completely liquidate all indebtedness. On December 4 th,
1934, the defendant's authorized agent signed an agreement whereby
the defendant was to accept $8ioo.oo in full satisfaction, "if payment
was made within 90 days after the date of this commitment." On
January Ist, 1935, the defendant notified the land bank that it would
not abide by the agreement, and the evidence clearly showed that,
because of this, the plaintiff was delayed in securing the loan and did
not tender the amount due the defendant until April 25 th, 1935, or 52
days after the date set. The defendant then refused to carry out the
contract, and the plaintiff asks specific performance. The court held
that time had been made of the essence of the contract because it was
specifically carried into the proposal and circumstances of the agreement;
but that the delay of the plaintiff in making tender was caused by the
conduct of the defendant, and that this amounted to an excuse for the
delay of the plaintiff in tendering the amount due. Specific performance
was granted. Bretz v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 25 Ohio L.
Abs. 333 (1937)-
Judge Barnes dissented from the decision of the court on the ground
that this was really a case of an option so the condition precedent should
be strictly enforced.
The holding of both the majority and dissent that time was of the
essence of the contract seems to be well justified. Ohio cases have held
